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Recent neuropsychological and neuroscientiﬁc research suggests that people who expe-
rience more déjà vu display characteristic patterns in normal recognition memory. We
conducted a large individual differences study (n = 206) to test these predictions
using recollection and familiarity parameters recovered from a standard memory task.
Participants reported déjà vu frequency and a number of its correlates, and completed
a recognition memory task analogous to a Remember-Know procedure. The individual
difference measures replicated an established correlation between déjà vu frequency and
frequency of travel, and recognition performance showed well-established word frequency
and accuracy effects. Contrary to predictions, no relationships were found between déjà
vu frequency and recollection or familiarity memory parameters from the recognition test.
We suggest that déjà vu in the healthy population reﬂects a mismatch between errant
memory signaling and memory monitoring processes not easily characterized by standard
recognition memory task performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Theories of the déjà vu phenomenon derive from two dis-
tinct literatures: individual differences research and cogni-
tive/neuroscientiﬁc investigations of familiarity processes (see
Brown,2003; O’Connor andMoulin,2010 for reviews). The cogni-
tive andneuroscientiﬁc literatures point to there being adisruption
or misinterpretation of the familiarity signal that underlies recog-
nition. One prominent idea is that there is an overlap between
a perceptual experience (which is responsible for triggering the
déjà vu) and a previously stored representation. The experient
is unaware of the source of this evoked familiarity, leading to a
feeling of déjà vu. This account lends itself to laboratory experi-
mentation with the recognition without identiﬁcation paradigm,
where it is possible to make a stimulus familiar in such a way that
the participant is not aware of the source of the familiarity (e.g.,
Cleary, 2008; Cleary and Reyes, 2009; Cleary et al., 2009, 2012).
Such research places an emphasis on the role of familiarity in trig-
gering déjà vu. In the laboratory, participants report feeling more
déjà vu for items which share some overlap with a previously expe-
rienced stimulus, but only when this familiarity is not pinpointed
to a previous experience.
More recent developments in the déjà vu literature have
seen researchers draw on the dual-process theory of recognition
memory. Dual-process theory differentiates familiarity from a sec-
ond, less ambiguous recognition process, recollection (e.g., see
Yonelinas, 2002; Diana et al., 2006 for reviews). Empirical stud-
ies that differentiate recollection from familiarity have typically
found that recollection is slower, more accurate and associated
with higher subjective conﬁdence than familiarity. Recollection
can conﬁrm that memoranda which elicit high familiarity are
“old” by providing an unambiguous contextual memory from
the moment of encoding. It can reduce susceptibility to memory
distortions such as misattribution (i.e., the act of attributing a par-
tially retrieved memory to an incorrect source). And crucially, it is
proposed that one function of recollection is as a self-monitoring
strategy tominimizememory errors by disambiguating potentially
unreliable familiarity signals. The use of strategic memory mon-
itoring using recollection thereby avoids “illusions of familiarity”
(Mandler, 1980; Jacoby et al., 1989; Whittlesea, 1993) in a process
referred to as “recollection rejection” (Brainerd et al., 2003).
A déjà vu hypothesis which relies on the recollection rejection
mechanism posits that in order to experience déjà vu one needs
intact recollection to produce the clash in evaluations (see Spatt,
2002 for a neurological account of this view). That is, an inap-
propriate feeling of recognition will be generated, driven by an
erroneous feeling of familiarity. But, in order for this to be experi-
enced as déjà vu, it is critical that a separate memory monitoring
process gives rise to the belief, knowledge or feeling that this is
false. This view of déjà vu receives support from the temporal lobe
epilepsy literature. Martin et al. (2012) took two groups of tem-
poral lobe epilepsy (TLE) patients, some of whom did and some
of whom did not have déjà vu as part of their seizure manifesta-
tion. They show that the patients with TLE who experience déjà vu
have a familiarity disorder, as we would predict here. However, a
disorder in familiarity did not differentiate those who did and did
not experience déjà vu – both their groups of TLE patients were
less able than controls to use familiarity signals to judge whether
or not a stimulus had been previously seen. It was recollection
that differentiated the groups – TLE patients who had déjà vu
were better at using recollection to tell targets from lures than TLE
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patients without déjà vu. The interpretation of this ﬁnding is that
recollection is required to be aware of the erroneous familiarity
at play in the déjà vu phenomenon. Patients with TLE who have
both familiarity and recollection deﬁcits do not possess sufﬁcient
memory capacity to detect the error of familiarity. In this experi-
ment we take these ﬁndings and a similar task (Experiment 1 from
Martin et al., 2012) to a group of healthy undergraduates to see if
we can ﬁnd a similar relationship between recollection and déjà
vu experiences.
The individual difference literature is reviewed in Brown (2003)
and comprehensively detailed in Brown (2004). As an example,
associations are found with the degree to which people travel.
Chapman and Mensh (1951) found that only 11% of those who
did not travel experienced déjà vu, with the number increasing to
32% for those who traveled up to ﬁve times a year. Richardson and
Winokur (1967) also found increased reports of déjà vu when they
compared thosewho traveledwith thosewhodid not. Associations
between the propensity for the experience andother individual dif-
ferences have been used to investigate the triggers of and bases for
déjà vu. For instance, given a null predictive effect of déjà vu on
dissociative experiences in a sample of 227 healthy participants,
Adachi et al. (2008) concluded that déjà vu was not a dissocia-
tive experience. Whilst the precise mechanism by which travel
frequency provides increased opportunity for déjà vu experiences
remains open, the robust association and the inter-individual vari-
ability in travel frequency make it an ideal variable to use as an
individual difference association check in déjà vu assessments on
otherwise homogenous (e.g., age-restricted) samples.
In a neat integration of the individual differences and neuro-
scientiﬁc literatures, Brázdil et al. (2012) combined questionnaire
and imaging methods to search for structural correlates of déjà vu.
In 113 healthy participants who had been administered the Inven-
tory for Déjà vu Experiences Assessment (IDEA; Sno et al., 1994),
they also measured grey matter volume in brain structures critical
for recognition. Using an initial split of the sample according to
whether or not they had ever experienced déjà vu, they identi-
ﬁed brain regions whose morphology differed according to déjà
vu experience. Grey matter volume from these regions was then
correlated with frequency estimates from the questionnaire, with
the ﬁnding that it was negatively associated with déjà vu experi-
ences, particularly in mesial temporal/hippocampal regions. That
is, people who experienced déjà vu had lower grey matter volume
of areas critical for recognition memory (though no differentia-
tion between neural correlates of familiarity and recollection was
made). Notably, in Brázdil’s study there were no behavioral mea-
sures of memory processes which, using a similar design and a
larger sample, we attempt here. Given that we can observe dif-
ferences in temporal lobe regions according to the frequency of
déjà vu experiences, we might expect that there is a behavioral
corollary.
The neuroscientiﬁc work of Martin and Brázdil leads us to pre-
dict that familiarity and recollection should be related to déjà vu
experiences in a group of healthy students, and generates testable
hypotheses about recognition memory performance and déjà vu.
These predictions differ according to which prior study is in ques-
tion. Brázdil’s work on the temporal lobe suggests a reduction in
volume for the people who experience déjà vu. Thus we might
expect a diminution of performance in recognition memory asso-
ciated with increased déjà vu experiences. Brázdil et al. (2012) do
not indicate whether they think that familiarity or recollection is
the process at play in déjà vu. According to Martin et al. (2012)
we expected that people who have déjà vu should have high rec-
ollection scores, in line with Martin et al.’s behavioral results in
TLE. In contrast, the work of Cleary and colleagues points to an
opposing prediction: because it is detected familiarity for a past
event which is not recalled, we might expect that déjà vu is caused
by a lack of recollection (e.g., Cleary, 2008; Cleary and Reyes,
2009; Cleary et al., 2009, 2012). In the current study we tested
these hypotheses with an individual differences approach. Par-
ticipants took part in a standard recognition memory paradigm
which asked for evaluations of recollection and familiarity via a
Remember-Know procedure, and we compared these scores with
the self-reported incidence of déjà vu, and a variable known to be
correlated with incidence: travel frequency.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 206 University of Leeds undergraduates (173
female) who completed the experiment as part of a laboratory
class. Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the Insti-
tute of Psychological Sciences Ethics Committee at the University
of Leeds.
STIMULI
A set of 80 words, chosen from the Gilhooly and Logie (1980)
1944-word database, was used for all participants. There were 40
high frequency words (min. familiarity rating 6.20; e.g., room)
and 40 low frequency words (maximum familiarity rating 2.40;
e.g., aperture).
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The experiment lasted approximately 15 min and was admin-
istered using Superlab Pro (version 2.0.2, Cedrus Software)
on IBM-compatible PCs. Participants were given the on-screen
instructions “Try and memorize each word for a later test,” before
beginning the study phase consisting of 40 study trials. During
study, they were presented with 20 high frequency words and 20
low frequency words in a randomized order. Each study trial word
was presented in black 48 pt Tahoma font on a white background
for 1,000 ms. A blank white screen lasting 500 ms followed each
study trial.
After the ﬁnal study trial, the test response options were
explained onscreen and participants were given the opportunity
to familiarize themselves with the terminology they would use at
test. The deﬁnitions provided to participants were as follows:
Remember - If you can remember contextual information
regarding your own thoughts as you initially saw the word e.g.,
“I thought of a striped horse” [zebra], press the “r” key.
Familiar - If you cannot remember anything contextual but are
familiar with the word from recent exposure to it, press the“f”key.
Guess - If you simply think you saw the word before but cannot
be sure, press the “g” key.
New - If you believe that the word is a new word not previously
presented to you, press the “n” key.
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Once participants were happy to proceed, they began the test
phase. The test comprised 80 words (40 previously presented tar-
gets, 20 high frequency lures and 20 low frequency lures) presented
in a randomized order. Each test trial word was presented in black
48 pt Tahoma font on a white background for 10,000 ms or until a
keyboard response with made. A blank white screen lasting 500 ms
followed each test trial.
After completing the test phase, participants responded to a
series of postexperimental questions including those assessing
gender, age1, déjà vu incidence, jamais vu incidence and travel
frequency as follows:
Déjà vu incidence: In the past 6 months, how many times have
you had the feeling of having experienced a sensation or situation
before in exactly the same way, when in fact you were experiencing
it for the ﬁrst time?
Jamais vu incidence: In the past 6 months, how many times have
you had the feeling that you had never experienced a sensation of
situation before when in fact you had (the opposite of déjà vu)?
Travel frequency: Approximately how many times in the past
6 months have you traveled more than 100 km from your home?
For the three questions above, participants responded using the
number keys zero to six to indicate that exact value, or seven to
indicate “seven or more”.
RESULTS
RECOGNITION PERFORMANCE
Recognition memory accuracy was high, as evidenced by the hit
and correct rejection rates. The mean overall hit rate (propor-
tion “old” responses to targets; includes “Remember,” “Familiar”
and “Guess” responses) was 0.819 (SD = 0.119) and the mean
correct rejection rate (proportion “New” responses to lures) was
0.742 (SD = 0.202). A frequency-based mirror effect (Glanzer and
Adams, 1990) was observed in the proportions of hits and correct
rejections to high and low frequency words. The mean proportion
of hits to high frequency targets (0.757, SD = 0.167) was signif-
icantly lower than to low frequency targets (0.879, SD = 0.115),
t(205) = 11.69, p < 0.001, d = 2.38. Complementing this differ-
ence, the mean proportion of correct rejections to high frequency
lures (0.690, SD = 0.249) was also signiﬁcantly lower than to low
frequency lures (0.792, SD = 0.185), t(205) = 8.41, p < 0.001,
d = 0.62.
Sensitivity (d ′) and bias (c) parameters were calculated from
the hit and correct rejection rates above using formulae from the
equal variance signal detection model (Green and Swets, 1966;
Macmillan and Creelman, 2005), and corrected for errorless
responding (Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988). The mean overall d ′
was 1.63 (SD = 0.65) whilst c was −0.12 (SD = 0.43). When
parameters for high and low frequency words were compared,
in keeping with the frequency-based mirror effect, mean d ′ for
low frequency words (2.11, SD = 0.77) was signiﬁcantly greater
than mean d ′ for high frequency words (1.32, SD = 0.76),
t(205) = 16.50, p < 0.001, d = -1.15. Despite the sensitivity
1Within our undergraduate sample, 94% of participants indicated that they were in
the 19–22 age range. Due to the highly limited variability in the age range of our
sample, we do not examine the relationship between age and any other variables
within the Results.
difference, there was no signiﬁcant difference in c for low and
high frequency words (−0.16, SD = 0.43 and −0.10, SD = 0.58
respectively), t(205) = 16.50, p = 0.053, d = 0.14.
RECOGNITION RESPONSES
The proportions of recognition responses to targets are summa-
rized in Table 1. Crucially for subsequent analyses, the proportion
of “Remember” responses is well below ceiling, and affords
the potential for interindividual variability in the recollection
parameters reported in Section “Recollection and Questionnaire
Responses” onwards.
To check that participants were using“Remember” and“Famil-
iar” responses in a manner consistent with their intended use, we
compared the proportions of targets that made up each response
subcategory (see Figure 1). The proportions from141 participants
for whom it was possible to calculate these values were entered into
a 2 (word frequency) × 3 (response type) repeated measures fac-
torial ANOVA. (It was not possible to calculate these proportions
for participants who did not provide a single instance of particular
response e.g., “Guess” responses to high frequency words, so these
participantswere excluded from the analyses reported here.) There
was a trend towards a main effect of word frequency, with recogni-
tion responses to low frequency words numerically more likely to
be given to targets (0.703, SD = 0.331) than recognition responses
to high frequency words (0.677, SD = 0.305), F(1,140) = 3.84,
p = 0.052, η2p = 0.027. Importantly, there was a signiﬁcant
main effect of response type, F(2,280) = 253.86, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.645. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons showed
that “Remember” responses comprised a signiﬁcantly greater pro-
portion of targets (0.947, SD = 0.105) than “Familiar” responses
(0.671, SD = 0.284) and “Guess” responses (0.453, SD = 0.299),
and “Familiar” responses in turn comprised a signiﬁcantly greater
proportion of targets than “Guess” responses, all ps < 0.001.
There was no signiﬁcant ANOVA interaction, F < 1. This pat-
tern of results is entirely consistent with the participants being
aware of the phenomenological differences between “Remember,”
“Familiar” and “Guess” responses, and using them appropriately.
These results provide a validation of the descriptives reported in
Table 1 as appropriate measures of recollection and familiarity to
be explored in subsequent analyses.
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
Mean responses to postexperimental questionnaire items and their
inter-item correlations are summarized in Table 2. Of particular
interest are déjà vu experiences, which were reported signiﬁcantly
more than jamais vu experiences, t(204) = 11.14, p < 0.001,
d = 0.78. The differences in reported incidence are also reﬂected
Table 1 | Proportion recognition responses to targets.
“Remember” “Familiar” “Guess”
High Frequency 0.467 (0.238) 0.164 (0.149) 0.126 (0.122)
Low Frequency 0.610 (0.226) 0.188 (0.181) 0.084 (0.091)
Mean (standard deviation in parentheses) proportions of all targets responded to
within the allotted 10,000 ms per trial.
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FIGURE 1 | Proportion targets comprising each recognition response
category. Bars show mean decision accuracy for all responses made
within the allotted 10,000 ms per trial. Error bars represent standard error
of the mean.
in the proportions of participants reporting no occurrence of each
experience in the previous 6 months, with only 0.16 of the sam-
ple reporting no déjà vu, compared to 0.66 making the equivalent
judgment of jamais vu occurrence.
We also observed relationships between variables in the pos-
texperimental questionnaire predicted from previous individual
differences research. There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation
between déjà vu incidence and travel frequency, r(203) = 0.216,
p = 0.002. Also of note is the trend towards a signiﬁcant pos-
itive correlation between the self-reported incidence of déjà vu
and jamais vu, r(203) = 0.129, p = 0.066. This may reﬂect
covarying tendencies to either experience these subjectivememory
sensations, or to report them.
Recollection and questionnaire responses
Recollection parameters were calculated by subtracting the pro-
portion of “Remember” responses to lures from the proportion
of “Remember” responses to targets. This was conducted for both
high and low frequency words, yielding two parameters, Rechigh
and Reclow . The equivalent calculation for “Familiar” responses
yielded Famhigh and Famlow parameters. Mean Rec and Fam
parameters, their inter-parameter correlations and correlations
with the individual difference measures of travel frequency and
overall d ′ (collapsed across high and low frequency words), are
summarized inTable 3. (BothRechigh andFamhigh parameterswere
signiﬁcantly larger than their low frequency equivalent parameters,
t(205) = 10.09, p < 0.001 and t(205) = 2.05, p = 0.042, respec-
tively, and so they have been examined as separate parameters in
these analyses.) These correlations go some way towards acting as
a manipulation check to establish the validity of the Rec and Fam
parameters.
As expected, there were no correlations between Rec and Fam
parameters and travel frequency (all ps > 0.379). There were
signiﬁcant correlations between both Rechigh and Reclow and d
′,
which unsurprisingly indicates that selective use of recollection
to disambiguate targets from lures is associated with greater over-
all performance on the memory task, r(204) = 0.627, p < 0.001
and r(204) = 0.340, p < 0.001, respectively. Signiﬁcant positive
correlations were also found between both Famhigh and Famlow
and d ′, r(204) = 0.261, p< 0.001 and r(204) = 0.272, p< 0.001,
respectively. Taken together, these correlations simplydemonstrate
the positive contributions to d ′ of Rec and Fam responses to tar-
gets, combined with the negative contributions to d ′ of the same
responses to lures. Combined with the cross-frequency correla-
tions, in which recollection parameters for each word frequency
category were positively correlated with the other frequency cat-
egory recollection parameter, and negatively correlated with both
familiarity parameters (all ps < 0.001), these relationships sug-
gests that participants were utilizing recollection and familiarity
in a stable and reliable manner to disambiguate targets from lures.
RECOLLECTION AND DÉJÀ VU
Three critical analyses were conducted on the relationships
between recollection and familiarity parameters and individual
differences in déjà vu experience. In the ﬁrst, we conducted
bivariate correlation analyses of the Rec and Fam parameters
and self-reported déjà vu incidence from the postexperimental
questionnaires (section Simple Correlations). In the second, we
restricted our sample to those with unusually low Fam parameters,
analogous to impaired familiarity, and repeated the correlation
analyses to establishwhether amore nuanced relationship between
Rec parameters and déjà vu exists in those with recognition perfor-
mance akin to impaired familiarity-based discrimination (section
Restricted Sample Correlations). In the third, we conducted logis-
tic regression analyses using the Rec and Fam parameters as
predictors, with the aim of classifying those who had and had
not experienced déjà vu in the past 6 months (section Logistic
Regression). Across all three analyses, we found no relationship
Table 2 | Postexperimental questionnaire descriptive statistics and correlations.
Déjà vu incidence Jamais vu incidence Travel frequency
Descriptives Mean (SD) 2.74 (2.11) 0.82 (1.59) 4.81 (2.26)
Correlationsr (n, p) Déjà vu incidence 0.129 (205, 0.066) 0.216∗∗ (205, 0.002)
Jamais vu incidence 0.104 (205, 0.139)
∗∗Signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level. One participant did not provide ratings for jamais vu incidence and travel frequency, which is reﬂected in the modiﬁed ns listed for
correlations involving these ratings. Means are likely to be underestimations of actual occurrence as the response option 7 represents “7 or more” occurrences of
the experience in the last 6 months.
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Table 3 | Recognition response descriptive statistics and correlations.
Rechigh Reclow Famhigh Famlow
Descriptives Mean (SD) 0.425 (0.239) 0.580 (0.226) 0.049 (0.186) 0.110 (0.214)
Correlations r (n, p) Travel frequency 0.006 (205, 0.930) −0.040 (205, 0.572) 0.062 (205, 0.379) −0.028 (205, 0.686)
d ′ 0.627∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) 0.340∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) 0.261∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) 0.272∗∗∗ (206, <0.001)
Rechigh 0.638∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) −0.353∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) −0.258∗∗∗ (206, <0.001)
Rec low −0.422∗∗∗ (206, <0.001) −0.654∗∗∗ (206, <0.001)
Famhigh 0.593∗∗∗ (206, <0.001)
Rec and Fam represent recollection and familiarity parameters, respectively, with subscript high and low indicating the frequency of stimuli for which the parameters
are calculated. d ′ represents the sensitivity parameter collapsed across both word frequency conditions; ∗∗∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level. One participant
did not provide ratings for travel frequency, which is reﬂected in the modiﬁed ns listed for correlations involving this rating.
between recollection and familiarity parameters and self-reported
déjà vu incidence.
Simple correlations
Scatterplots illustrating the simple correlation data are shown in
Figure 2. There were no signiﬁcant correlations between Rechigh
and déjà vu incidence, r(204) = 0.042, p = 0.552, or Reclow and
déjà vu incidence, r(204)= 0.029, p= 0.683. In equivalent analyses
of familiarity responses, Famhigh and Famlow were not found to be
signiﬁcantly correlated with déjà vu incidence, r(204) = −0.026,
p = 0.716 and r(204) = −0.032, p = 0.649, respectively. Overall,
there was no simple association between the tendency to differen-
tially employ either recollection or familiarity and the tendency to
experience déjà vu.
Restricted sample correlations
The tested hypotheses posit the cause of déjà vu as either erro-
neous familiarity that is disconﬁrmed or erroneous familiarity
that is left unchecked – déjà vu experients should feel familiarity
for a novel episode, but it is the interaction with one or other
extreme of recollection processing that drives the experience. The
analog of this amongst our sample would be people who had poor
discrimination in terms of familiarity and either excellent recol-
lective discrimination or poor recollective discrimination being
those who experience déjà vu the most. In the ﬁrst restricted sam-
ple correlation analyses, we selected a Famhigh threshold of −0.05,
above which participants were excluded from the analysis. This
left 34 participants in the subsample whose“Familiar” judgements
are characterized by particularly poor target-lure discrimination.
As was expected given the selection criterion, the mean Famhigh
parameter from the subsample (−0.208, SD = 0.184) was sig-
niﬁcantly lower than the population mean (0.049) inferred from
the complete sample, t(33) = 8.14, p < 0.001. Conversely, there
was no signiﬁcant difference in the subsample’s mean Rechigh
parameter (0.445, SD = 0.243) and the population mean (0.425),
t(33) = 0.488, p = 0.629. This suggests that within the sub-
sample of 34 participants whose “Familiar” judgements do not
discriminate targets from lures, the overall “Remember” response
discrimination is representative of the full sample. Even within
this subsample, the resulting correlation between Rechigh and
déjà vu showed no signiﬁcant relationship, r(32) = −0.051,
p = 0.774.
A second restricted sample correlation analysis echoed the
ﬁrst, this time using parameters from the low frequency words.
We selected a Famlow threshold of −0.04, yielding 35 partici-
pants whose mean Famlow parameter (−0.157, SD = 0.139) was
signiﬁcantly lower than that of the population mean (0.110),
t(34) = 11.15, p < 0.001. This time, the subsample’s Reclow
parameter (0.711, SD = 0.185) was signiﬁcantly higher than the
population mean (0.580), t(34) = 4.20, p < 0.001. The result-
ing correlation between Reclow and déjà vu once again showed no
signiﬁcant relationship between the two measures, within the sub-
sample, r(33) = 0.097, p = 0.579. Across both restricted sample
correlation analyses conducted on respondents whose “Famil-
iar” responses do not discriminate targets from lures, we found
no evidence that accurate recollection is associated with déjà vu
incidence.
Logistic regression
Finally, two logistic regression analyses were conducted to pre-
dict the report of one or more déjà vu experience in the previous
6 months using the whole dataset. These analyses aimed to estab-
lish whether the frequency of déjà vu experience (dichotomised
as those who experience déjà vu frequently, i.e., at least one
episode within the past 6 months, versus those who experience
it infrequently i.e., no episode within the past 6 months) can
be predicted by the recollective experience parameters recovered
using the memory test. The ﬁrst used Rechigh and Famhigh as pre-
dictors of déjà vu. When tested against the constant-only model,
the experimental model was statistically nonsigniﬁcant, indicating
that neither predictor reliably differentiated those reporting at least
one déjà vu experience from those reporting none,χ2(2) = 0.758,
p = 0.685. Nagelkerke’s R2 of 0.006 indicated a negligible relation-
ship between prediction and grouping, with prediction success
rate of 84%, but crucially, 0% accuracy in predicting those who
had not experienced déjà vu.
The second logistic regression model used Reclow and Famlow
as predictors, but again failed to improve upon the constant-
only model, χ2(2) = 4.55, p = 0.103. Nagelkerke’s R2 of 0.037
once again indicated a negligible relationship between prediction
and grouping and, with identical prediction rates to the previous
model, also failed to predict any of those who had not experienced
déjà vu. Across both logistic regression models, and all analyses of
association reported, therewas no signiﬁcant relationship between
www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 881 | 5
“fpsyg-04-00881” — 2013/11/26 — 10:47 — page 6 — #6
O’Connor and Moulin Déjà vu, recollection and familiarity
FIGURE 2 | Déjà vu-Rec and Déjà vu-Fam scatterplots. For all plots,
reported déjà vu incidence is plotted on the x -axis. y -axis plot Rec
parameters (top panels; calculated as “Remember” responses to targets
minus “Remember” responses to lures) and Fam parameters (bottom
panels; calculated as “Familiar” responses to targets minus “Familiar”
responses to lures). Separate Rec and Fam parameters were calculated
for responses to high frequency (left panels) and low frequency (right
panels) words.
individual differences in recognition memory parameters and déjà
vu incidence.
DISCUSSION
Recent studies have proposed that there is a relationship between
recognition memory (especially as subdivided into recollection
and familiarity and studied in the context of the temporal lobe)
and déjà vu experiences. Since déjà vu experiences are difﬁcult to
produce in the laboratory, a scientiﬁc line of enquiry has involved
using individual differences to explore the factors which inﬂuence
the frequencyof the experience.Weused this individual differences
approach onhealthy subjects to examine how recognitionmemory
test scores relate to the experience.
Our recognition memory test replicated standard word fre-
quency effects, with performance reliably above chance. With our
individual difference measures we replicated the typical correla-
tion between déjà vu frequency and frequency of travel. In short,
we have a well-powered memory experiment and a correlational
sample which replicates the established association with travel fre-
quency from the déjà vu literature, but which points to there being
no relationship between the tendency to experience déjà vu and
memory performance or recollective experience reported during
the test.
We expected to ﬁnd a relationship between memory measures
and the frequency of déjà vu experience. Within a sample of TLE
patients, Martin et al. (2012) found that recognition test scores
contrasting recollection and familiarity differentiate those peo-
ple who do and do not experience déjà vu. Brázdil et al. (2012)
found that in healthy participants, there are differences in the
brain structures of those people who do or do not experience
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déjà vu. These ﬁndings raise the possibility of observing memory
test score differences in the healthy population according to the
frequency of déjà vu experiences. That we found no relationship
between déjà vu and recollection – especially in such a large sam-
ple and where other correlations with the déjà vu experience were
observed – points to the fact that the experience is not captured
solely in terms of differences in the capacity for people to expe-
rience recollection or familiarity in a test of recognition memory.
Nevertheless, given the limitations associated with this interpreta-
tion of a null effect, we conducted a sensitivity power analysis to
determine the minimum correlation coefﬁcient we could reliably
detect with our sample. Based on a two-tailed alpha value of 0.05,
a power (1 – beta) value of 0.95 and our sample size of 206, we
recovered a minimum detectable correlation coefﬁcient of 0.247.
To reliably detect a smaller correlation coefﬁcient would require
a larger sample size than that which we tested. Put another way,
even if therewere a correlation of just below r = 0.247, the variance
in déjà vu incidence accounted for by parameters recovered from
standard tests of recognition would not exceed 6.1%. Of course,
it remains possible that measurable correlations between recol-
lection processes and déjà vu could be observed in other special
groups. Nonetheless our data suggest that there is not a relation-
ship between recollection and déjà vu in the neurologically normal
population.
If we assume that these data represent the true absence of an
association between recollection and déjà vu, how should they
inform cognitive theories of the déjà vu phenomenon? Elsewhere,
we have suggested that déjà vu is a randomneurological event (e.g.,
O’Connor andMoulin, 2010), echoing the claimof Penﬁeld (1955)
that déjà vu was akin to a subclinical minor epileptic event. This
means that although memory systems are implicated in the déjà
vu experience, it might not be individual differences in these sys-
temswhich capture differences in the frequencywithwhich people
have the experience. Instead, other individual difference variables
show a relationship with déjà vu, presumably which inﬂuence the
readiness to experience the event or the ability to articulate it. In
fact, we ﬁnd that although a test of recognition memory does not
correlate with déjà vu, a non-cognitive variable, travel frequency,
does. To explain this result we have previously applied an attribu-
tion discrepancy argument (Whittlesea and Williams, 1998). That
is, one will be more likely to detect déjà vu in situations where the
mismatch between the feeling of familiarity and the environment
is more apparent. Thus, the more one travels to novel places, the
more opportunities there are to experience déjà vu, assuming that
it is less likely to occur in mundane contexts. To experience déjà
vu, one has to detect that the feeling of familiarity is in fact false.
A novel context should aid this detection process.
Taking our null ﬁndings to indicate the absence of a relation-
ship between memory measures and the tendency towards déjà
vu experience is inconsistent with the ﬁndings from the TLE sam-
ple of Martin et al. (2012). However, it should be stressed that
their neuropsychological sample represents a set of patients with
clear temporal lobe pathology compared to our sample of healthy
undergraduates. Furthermore, déjà vu is often experienced as
“meaningful”or distressing in the TLE population, as well as being
reported more frequently (see Illman et al., 2012 for a review of
déjà vu in TLE). Thus, it seems reasonable that the TLE déjà vu is
a product of the unusual morphology or damage to the temporal
lobe. The fact that differences in déjà vu experiences are reﬂected
in recognition memory test scores is possibly just because the tem-
poral lobe is implicated in both. Damage to different structures of
the temporal lobe is reﬂected in the scores on tests of recollection
and familiarity, but this merely indicates the structures at play in
the experience, rather than implicating the process of recollection
in the déjà vu experience. In short, TLE déjà vu may be caused
by differential pathology of the temporal lobe which is revealed
in tests using recollection and familiarity, but in the intact tem-
poral lobe, tests of recollection and familiarity do not capture the
nuances of the experience.
Another methodological factor within the present study which
could conceivably account for the lack of an association between
basic memory processes and déjà vu the nature of stimuli used
in our recognition test. Other groups investigating déjà vu have
typically used rich visual stimuli reasoning that déjà vu is usually
encountered when faced with this sort of stimulus (e.g., Cleary
and Reyes, 2009; Martin et al., 2012). We chose to use visually pre-
sented word stimuli because we were not trying to generate déjà
vu but were attempting to show an association between estab-
lished basic memory processes, which word stimuli are used to
reliably recover (for a review seeYonelinas, 2002), and déjà vu inci-
dence. It remains possible that differences between the memory
processes applied to complex visual stimuli and visually presented
word stimuli could lead to the absence of correlation between déjà
vu and the basicmemory parameters recovered in this experiment,
whereas an alternate experiment using rich visual stimuli would
demonstrate such an association. If this ﬁnding was demonstrated
however, it would imply a dissociation between recollection pro-
cesses used for words and rich visual stimuli which in itself would
be a major issue (and a new ﬁnding) for dual-process theories of
recognition.
The Brázdil et al. (2012) data gave us our clearest prediction
that in healthy undergraduates we might see systematic differ-
ences in recognition memory according to the frequency of déjà
vu experiences. Again, this argument rests on anatomical differ-
ences in the temporal lobe, rather than behavioral markers of
the memory system. Crucially here, our behavioral work does
not support the idea that the propensity to experience déjà vu is
due to a marked change in the functional capacity of the tem-
poral lobe. One further consideration is that in their regions of
interest analysis, Brázdil did not examine many structures out-
side the temporal lobe. The temporal lobe is often referred to
as part of a memory network taking in the frontal lobes and it
has been speculatively proposed that it is the interplay between
these two regions which generates in déjà vu (see O’Connor
and Moulin, 2010). While this proposal has yet to be empir-
ically validated, there exists the possibility that the prefrontal
cortex and yet other brain regions might alternatively capture
the differences between those who do and do not experience
déjà vu.
Our concluding remark is related to the contribution of the
frontal lobes. The frontal lobes are often implicated in the strate-
gic regulation, monitoring and interpretation of temporal lobe
signals (e.g., Moscovitch, 1992). This collection of functions can
be construed as being “metacognitive.” Our proposal here is that
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it may be individual differences in metacognition which explain
the frequency of déjà vu experiences, rather than memory func-
tion per sé. One of the ways of thinking about metacognition is to
consider it as reﬂecting the relationship between our memory sys-
tem, and our experience of it. In the déjà vu experience, one must
consciously reﬂect on the signals being generated by the mem-
ory system, and we assume that this requires a rich network of
brain regions and a complex interaction of cognitive processes.
For this reason, some authors have described the déjà vu expe-
rience as metacognitive (e.g., Arango-Muñoz, 2010; Moulin and
Souchay, 2013), in the same way that other authors have described
the failure of word retrieval, the tip-of-the-tongue experience as
metacognitive (e.g., Bacon et al., 2007). Déjà vu and the tip-of-
the-tongue experience both signal information to the experient
about the ongoing processes in cognition, what have been called
“epistemic feelings” (Arango-Muñoz, 2010). If there is an individ-
ual difference variable which might explain the susceptibility to
the déjà vu experience, it may be the relationship we have with our
memory. To experience déjà vu, one needs to be able to reﬂect on
the mismatch between current feelings generated by the memory
system, and the contents of consciousness, and current experi-
ence. Perhaps to do this captures more than mere performance
on a recognition memory test. Future research could consider the
relationship between different types of metacognitive experience
in an individual differences design, and perhaps begin to evaluate
how people experience and interpret their memory system.
To conclude, the null correlations between recognition per-
formance and déjà vu experiences point to déjà vu remaining a
difﬁcult to research, infrequent and nebulous mental experience.
It seems reasonable to continue to assume that it is essentially a
quirk of the memory system, but déjà vu is not an experience
which is captured in the general population by differences in the
ability to recognize previously encountered information on the
basis of recollection or familiarity.
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